

Oct 21, Capt. Hauser to Gen Taylor: Mr. McN would appreciate the views of the JCS on the attached paper:

The President has ordered me to make certain that the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy will not be fired without his further authorization, even in the event of a selective nuclear or non-nuclear attack on these units by the Soviet Union in response to actions we may be taking elsewhere. You should take whatever steps may be necessary to assure that no such action without proper authorization could occur.

response, 21 Oct: It is the view of the JCS that the attached proposed statement should not be implemented for the following reasons:

a. Regardless of the actions which are taken unilaterally by the US, an attack by the Soviets on the Jupiter missiles positioned in Italy or Turkey would be considered by those ~~xxx~~ governments to be an attack on them and on NATO; thus, they would feel that we were bound by our Treaty obligations.

b. The release procedures in existence today require: 1) Presidential authorization for the expenditure of nuclear weapons.
2) Within ACE, SACEUR authorization to the custodial detachments for the release of weapons. For the JCS: Riley

Memo for Chairman, JCS. 2 Oct 1962

During my meeting with the JCS on Oct 1, 1962, the question arose as to the contingencies under which military action against Cuba may be necessary and toward which our military planning should be oriented. The following categories would appear to cover the likely possibilities:

- a) Soviet action against Western rights in Berlin calling for a Western response including among other actions a blockade of Communist or other shipping enroute to Cuba.
- b) Evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of bloc offensive weapon systems on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors.
- ~~xxxx~~ c) (Guantanamo, or attack on US planes or vessels) ; d) popular uprising;
- e) Cuban armed assistance to subversion; f) decision by Pres that affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing US national security.

May I have the views of the Chiefs as to the appropriateness of the above list of contingencies and answers to the following:

- a) the operational plans considered appropriate for each contingency...

..We can assume that the political objective in any of these contingencies may be either:

- a) the removal of the threat to US security of Soviet weapon systems in Cuba, or
- b) the removal of the Castro regime and the securing in the island of a new regime responsive to Cuban national desires.

Inasmuch as the Second objective is the more difficult objective and may be required if the first is to be permanently achieved, attention should be focussed upon a capability to assure the second objective.

RSM

John Hyland: in EE/ONE (Eastern Europe; SU) 5 June

1km

1. Initial attitudes in CIA estimate, 10-17 Oct.
2. Reaction when told.
3. Interplay with McC (McC certainty; theory; a nut; Rusk reaction)
4. memo over weekend; Kent attitude.
5. Konler interview: acted as if didn't know.
6. Turkey: our Rusk strategic territory, long before missiles put there; in Cuba, SU making free of "our" territory (what if they had created base, waited couple of years; eased in with subs, etc.)

7. Attitude to news of 11-20's; feeling that SU was "testing," faster than expected.

8. SNIE actually drafted last week in Aug (sure SAMS there).

xx McC rejected Cuban group SNIE, brought in EE to consider military buildup, possibility of missiles.

9. McC attitude; wrong guesses. ?

10. Theories of Sov calculation: 1) now accepting big risk; ~~xxxxxxx~~

below

2) Underestimating risk; 3) Hyland: desperation, severely pressed by need for improvement (last chance), led to wishful underestimation of risk; 4) (my?) risk not underestimated; but badly played by K, good circumstances for US, good playing by US;

11. Estimates played small role; discredited; worked mainly for McC, didn't influence him much; Pres relied on non-intell advisors and McC for predictions, didn't look to Estimates for predictions, analysis.

12. McC desire to bomb, hawk (eagle); but, prediction (early) of strong SU reaction (bomb Thule/ (Berlin, SEAsia, Turkey, Iran) to attack, especially if any Russian soldiers killed; thought gov should prepare.

✓

13. K interview with Gandni; fake mobilization, deployment, alert. ? question whether war would have followed.

14. No question put to ONE on effect of action/preparation/ultimatum (though memo to MCC, early, on ultimatum--instead of blockade; thought this would only lead to counterpressure by SU). No tendency to initiate such an estimate. If asked, would probably not have believed in brilliantly effective style of handling.

A 11/30/50

15. Sovs surprised (Zorin reaction; failure to hedge at all, e.g., to install SAMS before letting us see missiles). Effectiveness of our secrecy; due to what? Very bad "crisis management" by Sovs.

16. Process; special group in ONE; work on estimates; work for McC;

17. Process of producing SNIE, NIE (proposal accepted by Kent; draft; considered by Board; Board member chairman of est, intell comm representatives (e.g., Sohn) aid solicited, conference; USIB

18. Question of asking, in SNIE: 1) But suppose he got away with it, what would it be worth? 2) What would it take for him to get away with it; What might keep us from attacking? (He should have anticipated threats, deployment, etc; should have hedged more against possibility)

We were pressing someone (K), for distances - assuming he had full control (and obviously 71" his "responses" to see how he was using his control, what his thoughts were (will he lose?) - when he had already lost control (if he even had it, on Cuba! cf. NUN, Angola...)

preparatory move, and also a strong indication of what lies ahead...

JFK: I think we ought to do it.

(mixed voices)

Taylor: I might say this, that as a part of the help to cutting the time short of invasion, shipping is really more important than this, although I'm entirely for this (words unclear)

JFK: Well, tomorrow, when do we talk, Mr. Secretary, I thought maybe tomorrow we'd do the shipping. We ought to break it in two. Probably air is the focus of interest right now. What we're trying to do is get a settlement of this. I thought maybe the first one ought to be the air.

Voice: You alert them or call them up?

Voices: Call them up.

(mixed voices)

McNamara: I would like to put that out

(mixed voices)

McNamara: I can do it under the Executive Order that you signed granting me the authority (words unclear). I would like this to -- let me read this and see --

(Reading) Today U.S. unarmed reconnaissance aircraft, conducting surveillance of the build-up of offensive weapons secretly introduced into Cuba by the Soviet Union, were fired upon. Such surveillance operations were in accordance with the resolution adopted on October 23rd by the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American system under the provisions of the Rio Treaty of 1947. To ensure that the nations of the Western Hemisphere continue to be informed of the status of the threat to their security, it is essential that such reconnaissance flights continue. To protect these flight against attack, it will henceforth be accompanied by fighter escorts. The possibility of further attack on our aircraft, and the continuous build-up of the offensive weapons systems in Cuba, require that we be prepared for any eventuality. Therefore tonight, acting under the authority granted me by Execution Order such-and-such, I have instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to order to active duty twenty-four troop carrier squadrons of the Air Force Reserve with their associated support units.

Gilpatric: You might want to take out the sentence about the fighter escorts.

McNamara: Yes, I'd leave that out. (words unclear)

Taylor: (words unclear) about fighter escort and (word unclear) low level really doesn't mix.

JFK: Do we call up any fighters, or it'll just be troop carriers?

(mixed voices)

McNamara: We could call up some fighters (mixed voices) just cats and dogs, Mr. President...

(mixed voices)

Rusk: ... from the public point of view, and from the effect on Khrushchev you should add some fighters, even if you don't call up... (mixed voices)

Taylor: We have them off the coast looking for cripples, but they haven't been coming over because of the (words unclear)

McNamara: Dean, it's just not worthwhile... (words unclear)

Voice: I just wanted to be sure.

JFK: Now who announces this -- the Defense Department?

McNamara: Yeah, I'll do this (mixed voices & sounds)

(Pause)

(Discussion in low voices, not general, hard to understand. RFK concerned about next steps -- mention of POL -- tanker)

JFK: In addition it's not really his assurance to us, it's his assurance to U Thant and the United Nations.

(mixed voices)

JFK: I think we maybe ought to call Stevenson -- when the Secretary gets back we'll talk to him -- to tell U Thant this ship is coming on have him get (name close to "Zorin") or whatever it is ... After all, the assurance was to U Thant and not to me, that they'd keep them out of there. The U.N., for the record, is clearer.

Taylor: Mr. President, with regard to reconnaissance the Chiefs talked this over at great length. We would say there is no great -- no need for more reconnaissance tomorrow, except for the fact that we know that we should check on whether they're working or not. And secondly we think it would be a mistake to back away

(words unclear)

JFK: I agree (mixed voices) ... we also want to find out (words unclear) if they're firing tomorrow. If they're firing tomorrow we'd better announce that. I think -- uh -- Mr. Secretary, we were talking about this ship. He gave U Thant assurances on sending ships, so I think that we ought to, tonight, call Stevenson to inform U Thant that this ship is continuing to approach (words unclear) that we'd like to get some answer from them, whether this is going to be called back or otherwise we -- the confrontation must take place. It needs to be -- we ought to have the record a little better. Do you have any objections to...

McNamara: No, in fact I... (mixed voices)

RFK: Could we have a couple of minutes -- just a minute's discussion, as to whether we should intercept it or not. I don't know whether we think that that's advisable if we're going to -- uh -- face firing -- if they are firing on us. I should think the argument could go (words unclear)

Rusk: Well, I was just making a list here of the things that have happened today. By the way the intercept area business was available last night, I think.

JFK: I just want to call them, Bobby and tell them about the ship. We don't have to say what we're going to do about it, but I think we ought to tell them... (mixed voices)

RFK: Okay.

JFK: Will you find out where it is, Mac, in a technical way, and give them the latitude and longitude.

Bundy: I was just talking to Harlan Cleveland (mixed voices)

* good - except assumption "they" are Russian!
(otherwise, not relevant to ship!)